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A DANGEROUS PLACE TO DIG  
EXCAVATION AT THE TOE OF SALUDA DAM 
 
Elena Sossenkina   Scott Newhouse, P.E.   Matt Glunt, E.I.T 






Remedial work on the Saluda Dam will entail excavation at the toe to depths of over 50 ft.  Excavation at the toe of a large high hazard dam 
is an unusual event.  
 
Although statically stable the Dam doesn’t meet modern standards for dynamic stability. Based on the assessment of liquefaction potential, 
the dam requires remediation.  The downstream hazard entails consequences of failure of potential loss of life.  Due to such consequence, 
the Regulator called for renovation of Saluda Dam. Engineers evaluated several remedial alternatives.  The chosen alternative entails 
excavation at the toe for construction of new RCC and Rockfill Berms. 
 
Excavation at the toe of so large a dam, impounding so large a lake is a dangerous undertaking. It would be a daunting task even if there 
were no downstream hazard.  The hazard and consequences of failure in this case make it much more so.  The consequences of failure 
demand a high factor of safety.  The excavation concept entails powerful questions: How can it be done assuring safety?  What factor of 
safety is sufficient considering consequences of failure?  Are there not alternatives to excavation that will effect seismic stability?  
 
 
ABOUT THE DAM 
 
Saluda Dam located approximately 8 mi upstream of Columbia, 
South Carolina impounds 41 mi-long Lake Murray.  With more 
than 500 mi of shoreline, water area covering about 78 sq mi and 
storage capacity of more than 2,100,000 ac-ft of water, Lake 
Murray is one of the largest lakes on the East Coast.  Completed 
in 1930, the dam is 200 ft high and nearly a mile and a half long. 
Saluda Dam is a semi-hydraulic fill (“puddle fill”) hydroelectric 
dam. It is regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).  Original design and construction did not 
include any provisions for seepage control.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the dam’s dimensions, geometry, and 
downstream hazard.  The downstream hazard associated with 
Lake Murray is staggering.  An uncontrolled breach through 
Saluda Dam would cause a downstream flood near the City of 
Columbia, probably entailing loss of life.  Studies indicate that 




























Fig.1. Saluda Dam and Project Overview. 
 
 
The dam is earth fill, with no internal seepage control (filter or 
drain protection), and no cut off.  The dam was built by 
hauling fill to the embankment in rail cars, side dumped into 
piles on the upstream and downstream portions of the 
embankment (the two outer shells).  These piles were sprayed 
by monitors, sluicing the fine material into a central 
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Figure 2 illustrates this construction method- showing in cross 
section the sluiced core and the washed soils used to form the 
core.  Near the dam’s crest, these sluicing operations were 
stopped. The final portion of the embankment, within 30 ft of 
the crest, was constructed of rolled fill.   Riprap currently 
covering the downstream slope of the dam was placed as a 
remedial measure shortly after first filling to address seepage 
















NEED FOR RENOVATION 
 
The dam’s construction method comprises its problem- the 
sluiced fill materials.  This material has a loose (or very loose) 
relative density.  Consequently, the dam is susceptible to 
liquefaction during an earthquake.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
different zones of the embankment distinguished by their 
placement - washed soils sprayed by monitor to form the 
sluiced core, the sluiced core itself, and the outer limits of the 
dumped fill soils that were not sprayed with water during  
sluicing.  The top of the embankment is rolled fill. 
 
Earthquake loads can cause extreme settlement in earth dams, 
and loss of strength of soils, resulting in a slide within the 
dam’s slope.  A large slide or settlement could result in breach 
of a dam.  A breach of Saluda Dam presents danger for people 
and property downstream, as discussed above. 
 
Paul C. Rizzo Associates (RIZZO) investigated the dam to 
evaluate the behavior during and immediately after a major 
earthquake.  Based on the analysis, performed in accordance 
with the current Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) regulations, there is a significant potential for damage 
to the dam and potential for a breach under the dynamic forces 
caused by such an earthquake.  Figure 3 illustrates the finite 
element liquefaction analysis of the dam and FS against slope 
failure in a post-earthquake condition. 
 
Based on the results of the analyses, the dam requires 
remediation to comply with current FERC parameters for 
seismic loading—mainly because of predicted wide-scale 
liquefaction of the shells.  As mentioned, the hazard posed by 
the dam is very high (the consequences of failure include loss 
of life).  This hazard is the basis for the remediation, 
prevention of catastrophic flooding associated with failure.  





Fig.3. Liquefaction Potential Evaluation. Stability Analysis, 




 THE SOLUTION 
 
Engineers developed initial solutions that did not require 
excavation, focusing on renovation of the dam by ground 
modification.  Engineers examined alternatives including: a 
stability berm at the toe, deep soil mixing, and stone columns.  
An additional alternative combined deep soil mixing of a portion 
of the downstream shell of the dam with construction of a 
stability berm on the downstream slope and toe.  All of these 
ground modification alternatives were discarded as unacceptable. 
 The Owner and Engineer found the cost excessive, mainly run 
up by the size of the dam.  The Regulator had its own objections 
based on lack of performance history/data on such techniques as 
deep soil mixing for fills over 200 ft thick. 
 
RIZZO also evaluated the alternative of draining Lake Murray 
and rebuilding the existing dam according to modern standards. 
But the Owner’s requirements to minimize impact on the 
community, and not close the state highway along the dam’s 
crest ruled out this alternative.  
 
Due to problems with alternatives discussed above, the 
engineering focus turned to two primary remediation 
alternatives: 1. a massive rockfill berm on the downstream slope; 
2. a new RCC gravity dam downstream of the existing dam.  
Engineers concentrated on the berm, as the more cost effective 
choice.  In successive design iterations the size of the berm 
became successively larger.  Finally design reached a point 
where building a new dam was more efficient than building the 
sizeable berm. 
 
Engineers ultimately decided on the solution depicted on Fig. 4, 
a large new dam built immediately downstream of the existing 
dam.  In this approach, the existing dam is left to impound Lake 
Murray. The new dam will be “dry,” that is under normal 
conditions there will be a dry gap between the existing and new 
dams. The new downstream dam will impound water only if a 
sizeable earthquake were to cause the existing dam to breach 
(this event may never occur).   
 
As Fig. 4 illustrates, engineers found that a combination of the 
rockfill and RCC Dams was required.  For most of the alignment 
of the new dam there is sufficient room to build the design 
rockfill section.  However, in vicinity of the powerhouse and the 
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Saluda River, there is insufficient space for the rockfill slope- its 
toe would cover the powerhouse and reach the river.  
Consequently, this portion of the dam compelled an RCC section 






















Construction of the remedial, dry dam entails excavation at the 
downstream portion of the existing dam.  Soils susceptible to 
liquefaction were found in the foundation beneath the proposed 
new dam.  In order to address the risk of settlement and strength 
loss due to liquefaction during an earthquake, excavation of 
foundation soils deemed inadequate- not dense enough or strong 
enough, must be excavated from the footprint of the new dam. 
 
Construction of both the Rockfill and RCC sections shown on 
Fig. 4 entails excavation.  However excavation requirements are 
different for these two structures.  Rockfill excavation will reach 
a strong soil subgrade while RCC excavation will extend to rock 
subgrade.   Engineers set up a main stipulation for design:  No 
excavation into the existing dam. 
 
 
Rockfill Section Excavation. 
 
The depth of required excavation beneath the rockfill section 
posed a challenge.   The challenge of this task was finding a 
balance between two excluding requirements – keeping the 
existing dam stable (which ideally would mean no excavation 
at all), and providing a suitable foundation for the new rockfill 
section, requiring extensive and deep excavation.  
 
The established design criteria are summarized below:   
1. No excavation into the original dam was allowed (i.e. 
upstream of the original dam toe)  
2. A minimum depth of excavation of 10 ft was 
established to prevent piping through existing ground 
defects, such as tree roots, animal burrows, loose 
material, etc 
3. The excavation depth is the same for the Transition 
Zone (i.e. core or central portion of the Rockfill Dam) 
and downstream shell foundations, that is, no core 
trench. 
4. Excavation Slopes 
• Excavation slopes through residual soil were set at 
1.5H:1V. 
• Excavation slopes through riprap were set at 1H:1V. 
• Excavation slopes along the original sluiced 
embankment fill were set at 2.5H:1V.  
 
 
RCC Section Excavation 
 
Determining excavation depth for the RCC section entailed the 
same challenge - balancing foundation requirements of the new 
RCC section with safety of the existing dam- a balance between 
extensive excavation and none at all.  Engineers decided that the 
RCC section would require excavation to rock.  A more shallow 
excavation in conjunction with grouting to improve the lower 
foundation soils was evaluated; however site conditions 
precluded this choice.  For example, rubble and debris within the 
excavation footprint in vicinity of the powerhouse (left in place 
after original construction of the powerhouse) made the 
effectiveness of grout doubtful.  Excavation design entailed 
excavation to sound rock, seepage control for artesian water 




ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION APPROACH 
 
Excavation at the toe of so large a dam, impounding so large a 
lake is a dangerous undertaking. It would be a daunting task even 
if there were no downstream hazard.  The hazard and 
consequences of failure in this case make it much more so.  The 
consequences of failure demand a high factor of safety.  (The 
only thing that stands between inaccurate analysis and 
unexpected failure is a sufficient factor of safety.)  The concept 
entails powerful questions: How can it be done with safety 
assured?  What factor of safety is considered sufficient 
considering consequences of failure? 
 
Engineers set to work to answer the compelling questions.  The 
basis of excavation design was slope stability.  With a computer 
model of the existing dam in the excavated condition, with the 
cut slope configuration described above, shear strength 
parameters from extensive exploration and lab testing, the 
engineer team set out to determine dewatering and other 
excavation requirements to provide adequate factor of safety 
against sliding of the cut slope.  Engineers adopted factor of 
safety for the excavation that matched the service, un-modified 
condition of the dam.  Excavation has been designed for a factor 
of safety against slope instability of 1.5 for local, global, breach, 
and intermediate failure circles. Slope analyses were performed 
using shear strength parameters of the residual and embankment 
soils determined by consolidated undrained triaxial compressive 
strength performed on undisturbed samples. 
 
Dewatering to lower head within the dam and foundation is 
obviously required to maintain the factor of safety during 
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excavation, as addressed in the next section of the paper.  Slope 
stability analysis performed for 26 cross-sections identified target 
levels for dewatering. Target levels, or target piezometric 
elevations within the dam were setup to provide adequate factor 
of safety against slope failure during excavation. 
 
To further provide safety in excavation, engineers decided to 
excavate only in a limited area at one time.  The new dam 
footprint was divided into a series of excavation cells. Cells near 
maximum section, where the dam is tall and excavation is deep 
were designated as critical.  Engineers then established rules 
governing excavation.  Rules require excavation of only one 
critical cell at a time.  More than one non-critical cell may be 
excavated at once, provided they are separated by a minimum 
1,000 ft.  Excavation in a limited extent, in cells, should enhance 
stability in the cut slope by mobilizing soil shear strength in a 3 
dimensional aspect, versus a 2 dimensional, plane strain 
condition. 
 
Excavation and backfill work at each cell will be performed on a 
round-the-clock basis until the cell backfill reaches the 
designated backfill elevation- set up around the original ground 
elevation prior to excavation.    Excavation at the toe must be 
done as rapidly as safety and practicality will allow, so that back-





The objective of dewatering is lowering head within the existing 
dam and foundation to the target levels determined from stability 
analysis.  Knowing existing head in the different zones of the 
dam and foundation prior to excavation, and knowing the 
required drawn-down target levels from the stability analysis 
allowed engineers to decide on required methods to dewater the 
dam and its foundation.  Dewatering design was set up around 
the idealized cross section shown on Fig 2.   This idealized cross 
section has 3 layers: 1. broken rock foundation with artesian 
head; 2. foundation soil layer (residual soil for all but a small 
portion of the dam where alluvium is encountered near the river); 
3. embankment fill.  
 
The typical dewatering system is illustrated on Fig 5.  The 
components of this system are described below: 
1. Deep wells. Deep wells are drilled down into the 
broken rock layer.  Their function is the relief of 
artesian head in the rock layer.  Typical depth of the 
deep wells ranges from roughly 150 to 320 ft.  Nearly 
100 deep wells were installed on the project. 
 
2. Eductors. Eductors are used to dewater the embankment 
fill and foundation soil beneath the embankment. An 
eductor system uses a venturi to draw groundwater into 
the well screen and up a riser pipe to the header pipe at 
the surface.  Eductors can lower the water table by as 
much as 80 ft from the top of the excavation as opposed 
to approximately 15 ft for a single stage well point 
system. For most excavations, phreatic head had to be 
lowered more than 15 ft to reach target level.  For this 
reason, eductors were a better choice than well points.  
Eductors on the project range in depth from roughly 30 
to 70 ft.  More than mile and a half of eductor lines is 
currently in operation.  
 
3. Vacuum Wells. These wells have the same function as 
the eductors. They are installed in isolated places where 
lines of eductors cannot be placed (e.g. within the 
excavation), or where eductor lines are not as effective 




















RIZZO developed a detailed excavation monitoring program to 
detect any problems with the existing dam during construction 
activities. The main focus of the instrumentation program is 
timely measurements of deformation and soil pore water pressure 
within the embankment and foundation soils and assessment of 
incoming measurements.  Engineers interpret collected data and 
visual observations and determine if they are within acceptable 
ranges or indicate a potentially unsafe condition. 
 
The primary instruments to detect and predict slope failure or 
bottom heave are piezometers and inclinometers.  They are 
supplemented by surface monuments/laser lines.  Data from 
these instruments is used to identify the extent of any movement 





Typically, three rows of inclinometers are installed above each 
excavation cell, as shown on Figure 6, with a total of 65 for the 
entire dam. These instruments are used to measure subsurface 
deformations caused by slope movements. An inclinometer 
consists of a grouted-in grooved casing that is read using a level-
sensing probe manufactured by Slope Indicator. Typical depth of 
inclinometers on the project varies from 50 ft to 140 ft.   Most of 
them extend down to weathered rock.  However where the 
residual soil layer is thick the casing is terminated in competent 
residual soil.  Any movement shown in inclinometers can be 
verified by means of a laser shot through a line of targets or by 
GPS surveying of monuments.   
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Piezometers 
 
Electric vibrating wire (vw) diaphragm piezometers were chosen 
to monitor pore water pressure within the dam during excavation. 
Vibrating wire piezometers “pluck” a wire attached to a 
diaphragm.  As the tension in the wire and thus its vibrating 
frequency vary in proportion to the pore pressure against the 
diaphragm, the pore pressure can be determined. Engineers 
selected vw piezometers over other types (such as open 
standpipe), because of their quicker response time, ability to 
measure negative pore water pressure, and automating capability. 
 Significant time and cost was saved by choosing to install 
spring-activated vw piezometers (Model 4500-MLP, Geokon, 
Inc.) without a sand pack using the “fully-grouted” installation 
method (Mikkelson, 2002). Typically, two transducers are 
deployed per borehole as shown on Fig 6.  In total, more than 
100 multi-level vw piezometers are placed in this fashion within 
the dam.  Engineers monitor water pressure within the 
embankment and residual soil layers to ensure dewatered status 
of the dam and to detect any changes in pore pressure that could 
















Tiltmeters will be deployed to monitor movement of structures 
adjacent to the Saluda Powerhouse.  Tiltmeters will be installed 
during excavation in this area to monitor penstocks and 
circulating water pipes, and to monitor an existing concrete 
retaining wall behind the Powerhouse.  The penstocks and 
circulating water pipes are subjected to the full head of Lake 
Murray.  Because the consequences of damaging the penstocks 
or circulating water pipes are significant, it is important that all 
structures are closely monitored for potential deformations.   
 
Because of the risk associated with excavation and the 
consequences of failure, the instrumentation program must 
operate to obtain, reduce and interpret data as quickly as 
possible.  Engineers have to assess constantly changing, dynamic 
conditions associated with the fast pace, round-the-clock 
excavation and draw conclusions in a timely fashion. To 
accomplish this difficult goal, RIZZO set up a highly automated 
monitoring system. All vw piezometers in an Active Zone 
(defined as an open excavation cell and its two adjacent cells) are 
read using automated methods.  Vibrating wire piezometers 
installed in the dam above the cut are wired to a CR-10 
datalogger (Model 8020 MICRO-10, Geokon, Inc.) which 
converts raw data into pore pressure and then transmits this data 
to the construction trailer via radio link.  Piezometers nearer to 
the cut are wired to single-channel dataloggers (Model 8001 LC-
1 Geokon, Inc.) which must be downloaded in the field with a 
laptop computer.  The other key feature of the automated system 
is a wireless computer network (LAN) that covers the entire dam. 
This wireless network allows an engineer in the trailer to view 
inclinometer, piezometer, or tiltmeter data directly after it is 
downloaded to a laptop in the field.  Critical time is saved by the 




Excavation Monitoring Plan 
 
The purpose of the plan is ensuring that the existing dam behaves 
as predicted during excavation, and does not show evidence of 
impending movement, excessive settlement, erosion due to 
seepage, or other sign of potential distress.   
 
The plan must have action built in.  It is insufficient to simply 
deploy instruments and watch them.  One must know what it is 
the instrument should tell us, and what we will do as a result of 
its measurements.   
 
Accordingly, the plan spells out the action levels in response to 
instrument readings.  During excavation, engineers must 
constantly assess instrumentation data, determining if 
measurements fall within expected, acceptable ranges or indicate 
a potentially unsafe condition.  As excavation proceeds, 
engineers expect deformation within the existing dam to a small 
extent.  Engineers must evaluate this deformation, including site 
observations; the depth, extent, rate, and location of the 
deformation; and whether the deformation appears to be in 
response to specific construction activities. 
 
Threshold values of instrumentation measurements are 
established to indicate appropriate action in response to the 
measurements.  Response action is organized into four levels:  
1. Alert State; 
2. Warning State; 
3. Stop work; and 
4. Implement emergency measures such as backfilling the 
excavation. 
  
The Plan contains the criteria and threshold values defining each 
of these action levels.  Criteria for effects such as piezometer 
rise, inclinometer movement, rate of deformation and tolerable 
magnitude of these effects are contained in the Plan.  Specific 
steps for the Engineer, Owner, and Contractor are diagrammed 
for each of the action levels.  Related to the fourth action level, 
the project has a Construction Emergency Action Plan. 
 
 
Procedures and Frequency of Measurements 
 
Monitoring is accomplished by two independent methods: 1. 
visual observations by trained engineers; 2. by measurements 
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from the instruments discussed above.  These two methods are 
engaged to detect evidence of distress—specifically, movement, 
high water pressure, settlement, and erosion.  Monitoring of an 
excavation cell begins long before excavation commencement 
and continues 24 hours a day, 7 days a week after the cell is 
open. At the initial stages of excavation, every instrument is read 
at least once per shift. As excavation approaches the planned 
subgrade elevation, frequency of measurements is increased.  
 
Vital clues as to the dam’s behavior and potential failure modes 
developing can be missed if engineers focus on reading 
instruments only.  To avoid such a scenario, Dr. Ralph Peck  (a 
member of the project’s Board of Consultants) has called for a 
proactive approach including intense observation of the dam to 
evaluate and predict response prior to indications by instruments. 
 By carefully observing the dam’s condition and response, 
correlating it with construction activities, a much more proactive 
approach is effected. Is movement normal reaction of soil mass 
or beginning of unpredicted, unanticipated slide? Engineers 
must answer this fundamental question when early, small 





Herman Melville said that “Ignorance is the parent of all fear.” 
 Excavation in this project illustrates his remark, a remark 
about fear of the unknown.  If we knew how the dam would 
behave during excavation, there would be no fear associated 
with it. 
 
In fact we do not know how the dam will behave.  We know 
only of the consequences of failure.  We know by experience 
that in saturated soil conditions, bad things happen.  Slides 
develop in slopes, soils soften and lose strength, boils and 
internal erosion develop if the gradient is too high.  At the start 
of construction, whether these troubling things develop 
remains to be seen.  Accordingly, excavation for this project is 
a daunting task.   As engineers explained to the Owner and 
Regulator as they developed the instrumentation/monitoring 
program, until the excavation is made we won’t know how big 
the dragon is.  
 
Engineers make predictions about the dam’s response to 
excavation, about its stability.  But we cannot wait until after 
excavation, when the bottom is down to subgrade to evaluate 
the accuracy of those predictions.  Engineering practice is 
comprised of making predictions prior to construction, and 
then making observations during construction to evaluate the 
predictions’ accuracy.  The main function of instrumenting 
and monitoring the excavation in this project is evaluating 
stability, to ensure that predictions of stability are accurate.  If 
predictions are inaccurate, and stability is in question, we need 
to know as early on as possible.  Instrument data and 
interpretation are the tools to give us those indications.   
 
To guide in interpreting data and making decisions, engineers 
prepared a Monitoring Plan.  Engineers can change that plan 
as required as the dam responds to excavation and shows us 
what to expect.  As excavation proceeds, the dam shows us its 
response; the unknowns, or using Melville’s term- ignorance 
decreases.  The fear decreases proportionately. 
 
Our conservative approach to engineering reflects fear of the 
unknown, manifesting in the factors of safety that we apply, 
and what we term judgment.  Factors of safety reflect what we 
don’t know about the particular structure and foundation that 
we’re analyzing, and must also reflect the consequences of 
failure.  Given the high consequence of failure in this case, 
appropriate factor of safety was difficult to identify.  The only 
thing that stands between inaccurate analysis and unexpected 
failure is sufficiently high factor of safety; this tenet is the 
guideline for setting factor of safety. 
 
A prominent tunneling engineer remarked that “The ground has 
no commander.”  Instrumentation and its monitoring must be set 
up with this facet in mind- to listen to the dam, realizing that it 
doesn’t know how we expect it to behave, and realizing that we 
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